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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 Under Pennsylvania law, when a corporation fails to pay 
wages and benefits that it owes its employees, the corporation’s 
top officers can be held personally liable for the non-payments. 
 See, e.g., Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Ambrose, Inc., 
727 F.2d 279, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Antol v. Esposto, 
100 F.3d 1111, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997).  The purpose of this rule is 
to give top corporate managers an incentive to use available 
corporate funds for the payment of wages and benefits rather than 
for some other purpose.  Carpenters, 727 F.2d at 282-83.  Holding 
the managers personally liable serves to give them an incentive 
not to divert funds away from the payments owed to employees.  
The issue raised by this case is what happens when their company 
files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and the employees seek to 
recover from the corporate managers for unpaid vacation and 
retirement benefits that were allegedly earned in the pre-
petition period, but that became due only in the post-petition 
period.  The filing of a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 
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of the Bankruptcy Code bars the payment of pre-petition claims by 
the company.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (providing for automatic stay 
of creditors’ efforts to seek repayment); In re Eagle-Picher 
Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 861 (6th Cir. 1992).  The question, 
then, is whether, in this context, where, by law, the company’s 
managers have no discretion to order payment of the amounts owed 
to the employees, they can simultaneously be held liable for not 
making the payments.  We think not. 
 I. 
 The Shenango Corporation (“Shenango”) is a 
Pennsylvania-based producer of coke and iron products.  In 
December 1992, Shenango filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  A group of Shenango’s 
former employees (the “employees”) claim that they are owed 
specific sums of money for vacation and supplemental retirement 
benefits.  They filed this action pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”), 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 260.1 et 
seq.  The employees’ complaint asserted that Mark and Andrew 
Aloe, as officers of Shenango1, were personally liable for the 
benefits payments not made by Shenango. 
 The WPCL arms Pennsylvania employees with a statutory 
vehicle for the collection of unpaid wages and benefits and 
                     
1.  Mark A. Aloe was a member of Shenango’s board of directors 
from March 25, 1986 until February 17, 1993, and was chief 
executive officer and chairman of the board from March 25, 1986 
through June 20, 1990.  Andrew Aloe has been on the board of 
directors since March 25, 1986, and has been chief executive 
officer in the period subsequent to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. 
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provides for penalties to be imposed for non-compliance.  See 43 
Pa.C.S.A. § 260.1 et seq.  The WPCL defines an “employer” to 
include “every person, firm, partnership, association, 
corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this 
Commonwealth and any agent or officer of any of the above-
mentioned classes employing any person in this Commonwealth.”  43 
Pa.C.S.A. § 260.2a.  The definition of an “employer” under the 
WPCL has been held to include a corporation’s highest ranking 
officers, because they are the persons who are likely to have 
“established and implemented the policy for the non-payment” of 
the wages and benefits at issue.  Carpenters, 727 F.2d at 283.  
In addition to providing for civil remedies and penalties, see 43 
Pa.C.S.A. § 260.9a, the WPCL also provides for criminal 
penalties, see 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 260.11a. 
 The employees in this case are seeking recovery of 
vacation pay and supplemental retirement benefits.  If Shenango 
had not filed for bankruptcy, it appears that the Aloes, as 
officers of Shenango, might indeed have been personally liable 
for the claimed amounts.  Any sums that may have been due and 
owing by Shenango prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition 
appear to fall within the ambit of the WPCL and, thus, arguably 
were residual obligations of the Aloes.  The employees’ claims 
here, however, arose out of the post-petition cessation of the 
employees’ benefits.  The claims arose out of pre-petition 
obligations, but arose with respect to payments that came due in 
the post-petition period. 
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 The employees originally brought their action in 
Pennsylvania state court.  The Aloes then removed the action to 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania pursuant to the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1452, which generally permits the removal of any claim 
or cause of action if the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.2  From there, the matter was 
referred to the bankruptcy court.  The bankruptcy court granted 
Shenango’s and the Aloes’ motions for summary judgment on the 
ground that the WPCL was pre-empted by federal bankruptcy law.  
The district court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, but 
not based on pre-emption.  The court reasoned that because the 
filing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition operated to bar 
Shenango from making payments on debts, such as the employees’ 
claims, that came due in the post-petition period, the purpose of 
the WPCL would not be furthered by holding the corporation’s 
officers personally liable.3  We affirm.   
                     
2.  The Aloes, through a third-party complaint, joined Shenango 
as a defendant on a claim for indemnification.  The 
indemnification claim was based on the by-laws of Shenango that 
imposed an affirmative obligation on Shenango to indemnify its 
officers and directors for reasonable expenses, judgments, fines, 
or costs incurred in a legal proceeding. 
3.  In a recent case, Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1114 (3d 
Cir. 1997), employees brought suit under the WPCL against a 
corporation’s officers and shareholders for wages earned in the 
post-petition period pursuant to a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (“CBA”).  The court rejected the WPCL claims on the 
ground that the suit was based on the terms of the CBA and was 
therefore preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act.  Id.  The court noted, however, 
that 11 U.S.C. § 1113 provides that a CBA remains in full force 
in a Chapter 11 proceeding until rejection is approved by a 
bankruptcy judge, id. at 1121 n.4, and that, in the Chapter 11 
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 II. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 The employees question whether the bankruptcy court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.  They argue here, 
as they did before the district court, that (1) the Aloes’ claim 
for indemnification against Shenango is barred by 11 U.S.C. § 
502(e)(1)(B) because it is a contingent claim against the 
bankrupt estate, (2) the Aloes’ indemnity claim is barred by the 
terms of Shenango’s confirmed plan because the Aloes did not file 
a timely proof of claim before the bankruptcy court, and (3) the 
Aloes’ indemnity claim was a collusive attempt to manufacture 
jurisdiction. 
 In analyzing the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the district court first looked to the relevant 
statutory sections.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)4, a district 
court 
(..continued) 
context, arbitration brought pursuant to a CBA is not subject to 
the automatic stay.  Id.   
4.  Similarly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 (a) & (b)(1): 
 
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all 
cases under title 11 and any or all 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising 
in or related to a case under title 11 shall 
be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the 
district. 
 
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all 
cases under title 11 and all core proceedings 
arising under title 11, or arising in a case 
under title 11, referred under subsection (a) 
of this section, and may enter appropriate 
orders and judgments, subject to review under 
section 158 of this title. 
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shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of 
all civil proceedings arising under title 11, 
or arising in or related to cases under title 
11. 
 
 Under the above provision, the answer to whether there 
is subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the cause of 
action “aris[es] under,” “aris[es] in,” or is “related to” a case 
under title 11 -- in this case, the Shenango bankruptcy 
proceeding.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 
 The employees are suing the Aloes for nonpayment of 
amounts allegedly owed to them by Shenango.  Based on an express 
provision in Shenango’s by-laws, the Aloes have an 
indemnification claim against Shenango.  The district court held 
that, at a minimum, the existence of this indemnification claim 
demonstrated that the employees’ claims against the Aloes could 
conceivably have an effect on the bankruptcy estate and therefore 
satisfied the “related to” test.  Hence, the court determined 
that there was subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of 
action. 
 In Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984), we 
explained that: 
the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is 
related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome 
of that proceeding could conceivably have any 
effect on the estate being administered in 
bankruptcy . . . .  Thus, the proceeding need 
not necessarily be against the debtor or 
debtor’s property.  An action is related to 
bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the 
debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or 
freedom of action (either positively or 
negatively) and which in any way impacts upon 
the handling and administration of the 
bankrupt estate. 
  
 
 8 
Id. at 994 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
 Pacor holds that the reach of “related to” jurisdiction 
is very broad, extending to any action the outcome of which 
“could conceivably have any effect on the estate being 
administered in bankruptcy.”  Id.; see also Donaldson v. 
Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1997).  Based on the 
broad reach of the term “related to,” we agree with the district 
court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the employees’ action.  In fact, Pacor specifically notes 
that contractual indemnity claims can have an effect on a 
bankruptcy estate and thus provide a basis for the exercise of 
“related to” jurisdiction.  743 F.2d at 995; see also A.H. Robins 
Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).5  
                     
5.  In an analogous context, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a stay 
granted by a district court in derivative actions against a 
bankrupt debtor corporation’s non-bankrupt directors.  See In re 
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 857 (6th Cir. 1992).  
The debtor corporation in Eagle-Picher had filed a Chapter 11 
petition and availed itself of the automatic stay against 
creditor actions.  Id.  There remained, however, actions against 
two of the debtor corporation’s individual officers.  Id.  
Reasoning, in part, that the existence of absolute indemnity 
agreements between the officers and the debtor corporation 
created such an identity between the debtor and the individual 
officers that allowing the suit to proceed against the officers 
would, in effect, be allowing the suit to proceed against the 
bankrupt debtor, the court affirmed the stay on the actions 
against the non-bankrupt officers.  Id. at 860-61; see also David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 501 & n.128 (1994).  
The rationale applied in Eagle-Picher was one first articulated 
in A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999-1001 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986), that has since been 
adopted by this Circuit. See McCartney v. Integra Nat’l Bank N., 
106 F.3d 506, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing and applying the 
Robins principle).   
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 The employees’ attacks on the district court’s 
determination that there was subject matter jurisdiction are 
misdirected.  The employees’ first two arguments are that the 
indemnification claims are barred since (1) the claims were 
contingent and (2) timely proof of claim was not made.  As the 
district court pointed out, however, the question whether the 
claims are barred is one for none other than the bankruptcy 
court. 
 The employees’ third argument is that the Aloes’ 
indemnification claims represent a collusive attempt to 
manufacture jurisdiction and are therefore barred under the 
collusive joinder provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1359.  This provision 
states: 
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil 
action in which any party, by assignment or 
otherwise, has been improperly or collusively 
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of 
such court. 
 
 The district court pointed out that it was unclear 
whether Section 1359 even applied to federal question cases, 
i.e., non-diversity cases.  But whether or not it applied, the 
court held that the “collusive joinder” claim failed because it 
was not supported by any evidence.  We agree.  The employees 
state in conclusory fashion that the Aloes’ indemnity claim 
against Shenango was pretextual and was asserted solely in order 
to create federal jurisdiction.  The only explanation the 
employees give for their conclusion is that “Shenango has never 
defended against [the Aloes’] third party claims for indemnity.” 
 But we do not see why Shenango should necessarily have defended 
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against the Aloes’ claims if the claims were valid -- as they 
appear to be under Shenango’s by-laws.  In sum, the employees 
have failed to show error in the district court’s analysis of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Cf. Sterling Nat’l Mortgage Co., v. 
Mortgage Corner, Inc., 97 F.3d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1996) (conclusory 
allegations are not sufficient to survive summary judgment). 
B. Removal 
 An issue not raised by the employees, but raised by us, 
sua sponte, is whether, notwithstanding the existence of subject 
matter jurisdiction, removal was proper under the general removal 
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).  This provision states: 
Any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or 
right arising under the Constitution, 
treaties or laws of the United States shall 
be removable without regard to the 
citizenship or residence of the parties.  Any 
other such action shall be removable only if 
none of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants is a citizen 
of the State in which such action is brought. 
  
 The Aloes, as defendants, do not contend that they are 
citizens of a state other than the one in which the action was 
brought, i.e., Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, if 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
applies to this case6 removal was proper only if the action is 
                     
6.  As previously noted, this action was removed, not under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441, but under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, which specifically 
authorizes the removal of most claims or actions over which the 
district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1334.  In Pacor, we said that “sections 1441-1447 were never 
meant to be read into the procedures for bankruptcy removals.”  
743 F.2d at 992.  However, in Things Remembered, Inc., v. 
Petrarca, 116 S. Ct. 494, 497 (1995), the Supreme Court held that 
the procedural requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) apply to a 
case that is removed under the special bankruptcy removal 
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1452, that the defendants utilized here.  
See also Donaldson, 104 F.3d at 553 n.1.  Consequently, if the 
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one that “aris[es] under” federal law within the meaning of that 
provision.  
 Whether this is so is an interesting question.  On the 
one hand, the employees’ action plainly asserted a claim under 
state law (namely, the Pennsylvania WPCL), and federal law 
appears to have been implicated in the form of a defense to the 
state law claim.  Cf. Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful 
Pleading Doctrine, 44 Hastings L. J. 273, 275-76 (1993) 
(defendant cannot create federal question jurisdiction by 
pleading federal defenses to state claims alleged in state 
court).  On the other hand, if we are correct in holding that the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1334(b) -- and we believe that binding precedent plainly dictates 
that conclusion -- and if the jurisdictional grant set out in 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(b) is based on the “arising under” jurisdiction of 
Article III of the Constitution, it must follow that the 
(..continued) 
reasoning of Things Remembered applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), as 
well as 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the former provision applies in this 
case. 
 
    To read Sections 1452 and 1441(b) as working in conjunction 
would provide plaintiffs in “related to,” but not “arising 
under,” cases with greater control over the choice of forum than 
defendants.  Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer and 
David L. Shapiro, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1616 
(1996) (noting, in the context of removal, that there are a 
number of federal statutes under which defendants are denied the 
choice of forum given to plaintiffs).  Under such a system, a 
state law claim that was “related to,” but not “arising under,” a 
title 11 proceeding, could be brought by the plaintiff in a state 
court of the state in which the defendant was a citizen, and 
would not be removable, even though the case could have 
originally been brought in federal court.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1441(b) & 1452. 
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employees’ action is one that arises under federal law for 
constitutional purposes.    
 We need not, however, attempt to resolve the question 
whether the removal in this case was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 
1441(b).  The issue of improper removal was not raised at the 
time of the removal, and any claim was therefore waived.  Where a 
case could have been originally filed in federal court but there 
is an irregularity in its removal from state court, that 
irregularity is waivable.  See Korea Exch. Bank v. Trackwise 
Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1995).  In other words, 
since this cause of action could have been brought originally in 
federal court, any defects in the removal of the case from state 
court were “procedural,” as opposed to “jurisdictional,” and were 
thus waivable.  Id.  As the Supreme Court said in Grubbs v. 
General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972): 
We have concluded that, whether or not the case was 
properly removed, the District Court did have 
jurisdiction of the parties at the time it 
entered judgment.  Under such circumstances 
the validity of the removal procedure 
followed may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal.  
 
Id. at 700; cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 117 S. Ct. 467, 475 
(1996) (citing Grubb). 
C. WPCL  
 The substantive issue in this case is whether the 
employees can sue the Aloes, as officers of Shenango, under the 
WPCL for Shenango’s non-payment of certain pre-petition benefits 
that became due to the employees in the period after Shenango had 
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filed for bankruptcy.  The district court rejected the employees’ 
WPCL claim because the failure to pay benefits by Shenango 
occurred after the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The court 
reasoned that the failure to pay was caused by the Bankruptcy 
Code’s prohibition on Shenango’s making such payments, and not by 
the Aloes’ voluntary choice to refrain from making them. 
 The WPCL provides, with respect to fringe benefits and 
wage supplements, that 
[e]very employer who by agreement deducts union dues 
from employees’ pay or agrees to pay or 
provide fringe benefits or wage supplements, 
must remit the deductions or pay or provide 
the fringe benefits or wage supplements, as 
required, within 10 days after such payments 
are required to be made to the union in the 
case of dues or to a trust or pooled fund, or 
within 10 days after such payments are 
required to be made directly to the employee, 
or within 60 days of the date when the proper 
claim was filed by the employee in situations 
where no required time for payment is 
specified.  
 
43 Pa.C.S.A. § 260.3(b). 
 The WPCL further provides that 
[a]ny group of employees, labor organization or party 
to whom any type of wages is payable may 
institute actions provided under this act. 
 
43 Pa.C.S.A. § 260.9a(a) (emphasis added).  
 The parties do not dispute that under the WPCL the top 
management of a company can be held liable for wages that are 
owed by the company.  The dispute here is over whether the 
employees’ claim is for benefits that were “due and payable” 
under the WPCL.  The district court held that they were not since 
federal bankruptcy law operated to prevent these benefits (which 
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came due after Shenango filed for bankruptcy) from being “due and 
payable.”  We agree. 
 The liability of corporate managers under the WPCL is a 
“contingent” liability, i.e., it is contingent on the 
corporation’s failure to pay debts that it owes.  See Laborers 
Combined Funds of W. Pa. v. Mattei, 518 A.2d 1296, 1300 (1986) 
(“the only apparent purpose [of holding managers liable for wages 
and benefits not paid fully by the company] was to subject these 
persons to liability in the event that a corporation failed to 
make wage payments”) (emphasis added); accord Carpenters, 727 
F.2d at 282-83.  Once a corporation files a Chapter 11 petition, 
however, it is obligated to pay wages and benefits only to the 
extent required by the bankruptcy workout.  Cf. In re Ribs-R-Us, 
Inc., 828 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing the effect on 
a debtor of the filing of a petition in Chapter 11).  Hence, when 
a corporation under Chapter 11 fails to make payments that the 
Bankruptcy Code does not permit, the contingency needed to 
trigger the liability of corporate managers under the 
Pennsylvania WPCL never occurs.  Here, Shenango was current on 
all of its payments in the pre-petition period.  The employees’ 
claims are for amounts that technically came due in the post-
petition period.  Since the corporation was not permitted by law 
to pay these claims in the post-petition period, the contingency 
of the amounts becoming “due and payable” under the WPCL did not 
occur, and hence the managers were not personally liable. 
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 This conclusion is consistent with the goals underlying 
the WPCL.  Pennsylvania’s purpose in holding the agents and 
officers of a corporation liable for unpaid wages and benefits is 
to give those agents and officers an incentive to pay wages and 
benefits while the corporation still has the resources to do so. 
 See Mohney v. McClure, 568 A.2d 682, 685 (1990), aff’d per 
curiam, 604 A.2d 1021 (1992).  Put differently, the WPCL seeks to 
deter corporate managers from diverting corporate funds that are 
meant to go towards paying wages and benefits.  For example, one 
could imagine a situation in which a firm is under the threat of 
bankruptcy and the managers’ primary concern is saving their jobs 
(i.e., keeping the company out of bankruptcy) as opposed to 
paying the employees from the available funds.  In such a 
situation, managers might be tempted not to use available funds 
to pay wages and benefits owed to the employees.  Instead, they 
might be tempted to employ the funds in a high risk gamble that, 
if successful, might prevent bankruptcy and hence save the 
managers’ jobs but that most likely will fail and result in a 
loss of the funds.  See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking 
and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. Legal Stud. 277 
(1991); cf. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of 
Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 
1159, 1162 & n.16 (1994).  
 Given that the purpose of the WPCL is to deter managers 
from strategically diverting company resources away from the 
payment of wages and benefits, it makes sense for the WPCL to 
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apply in only those contexts in which the managers have room to 
behave strategically.  Indeed, the courts have applied the WPCL 
in precisely this manner.  In Mohney, the court refused to hold a 
corporate secretary liable for unpaid wages and benefits, where 
the secretary, who earned no more than a small retainer, had no 
role in the corporate decision making processes.  568 A.2d at 686 
(liability under the WPCL is premised on the person being held 
liable being an “active decision mak[er]” in the context of 
deciding not to pay the employees); see also Central Pa. 
Teamsters Pension Fund v. Burten, 634 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Pa. 
1986) (absent some indication that the defendant exercised a 
policy-making function in the company, he could not be held 
liable under the WPCL). 
 The logic of Mohney applies to this case.7  Shenango 
was current on its payments to the employees up to the point of 
filing for bankruptcy.  Once Shenango filed for bankruptcy, 
however, management no longer had the power to choose not to use 
the corporation’s funds to pay wages.  Specifically, once 
Shenango went into bankruptcy, bankruptcy law compelled it to 
refrain from paying the employees’ claims.  In this context, it 
is easy to see that management was not in the position of an 
                     
7.  The WPCL is a penal statute.  The narrow interpretation given 
to it by the Mohney court is consistent with Pennsylvania’s rule 
of statutory interpretation that doubts about the reach of a 
penal provision are to be resolved in favor of a narrow 
construction.  See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1) (penal provisions are 
to be strictly construed); cf. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and 
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 935 
(1992). 
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“active decision maker” vis-a-vis choosing not to pay employees 
benefits that technically became due in the post-petition 
period.8  Therefore, the WPCL did not come into play.9 
                     
8.  This exception to the applicability of the WPCL is not an 
attempt to incorporate a scienter requirement into the WPCL.  See 
Mohney, 568 A.2d at 686.  We note, however, that there exists at 
least one situation in which corporate officers are held 
statutorily liable for the non-payment of debts owed by the 
corporation and where this liability is premised on a 
determination of willfulness.  The context is that of taxes, such 
as withholding and social security taxes, that are required to be 
deducted by employers from the wages paid to employees.  In this 
context, Congress has imposed personal liability on any officer 
or employee who “willfully fails to collect such tax, or 
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the 
payment thereof.” 26 U.S.C. 6672(a); Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200. 
 Part of the rationale underlying the imposition of such 
liability was the recognition that “taxes collected by a 
corporate employer on behalf of employees `can be a tempting 
source of ready cash for a failing corporation beleaguered by its 
creditors.’” Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 200 (quoting Slodov v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978)).  
 
  
9.  One might ask, as the dissent does, why this case is 
different from an ordinary third-party guaranty of a debt, where 
the purpose of the guaranty is to ensure that the creditor 
receives complete and timely payment even if the primary debtor 
goes into bankruptcy and avails itself of the automatic stay.  
The reason for the difference is that the secondary liability of 
managers under the WPCL attaches only when they are “active 
decision makers.”  In other words, their liability is not 
automatic, but is premised on their being in a position to stop 
the original non-payment.  This makes the WPCL manager liability 
different from an ordinary contract guaranty. 
 
 The dissent fears that this case will radically alter 
the law applicable to all forms of contractual guaranties.  Our 
decision here, however, is predicated solely on an interpretation 
of Pennsylvania law on the WPCL.  It is predicated on the 
existence of the “active decision maker” component of the WPCL; a 
component provided by the Pennsylvania courts.  Unless private 
parties agree to include such a component in their guaranties, we 
fail to see how this decision will affect those contracts.  
 
 Further, the dissent suggests that under the WPCL there 
cannot be any doubt as to Pennsylvania’s legislative intent to 
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 The employees, however, argue that the district court’s 
decision was inconsistent with the applicable case law.  In 
particular, they point to Mohney and Adams v. Benjamin, 627 A.2d 
1186 (1993).  We disagree with the employees with respect to both 
cases. 
 In Mohney, the plaintiff was asserting claims for wages 
that allegedly had been accrued but were only partially paid at 
the time of filing for bankruptcy.  568 A.2d at 684.  The 
employees read Mohney to hold that claims for wages that were 
accrued at the time of the filing for bankruptcy, but that did 
not come due until after the filing of the petition, were valid 
under the WPCL.  We do not read Mohney to say any such thing.  
The language in Mohney to which the employees point is the 
(..continued) 
hold its corporate officers and directors liable for the unpaid 
wage and benefits debts of the corporation when the corporation 
itself is temporarily stayed, by operation of the Bankruptcy 
Code, from paying those debts.  We disagree. 
 
 Corporate bankruptcies are not unusual events.  When 
companies go into Chapter 11, it can take them substantial 
periods of time to emerge.  During the period the corporation is 
in Chapter 11, it is stayed from paying its pre-petition debts.  
Under the dissent’s interpretation of the WPCL, the officers and 
directors of Pennsylvania corporations would be personally liable 
for covering these unpaid wage and benefits debts during the 
entire period of the stay -- even though these were amounts that 
became due only after the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The 
combination of (1) a corporation with a large workforce and (2) a 
lengthy bankruptcy workout, would result in staggering personal 
liability for the corporate officers.  That, in turn, would 
produce a serious incentive for corporations to avoid locating in 
Pennsylvania.  Without clear indication from the legislature that 
its intent was to impose such a regime, we, unlike the dissent, 
decline to read such an intent as obvious. 
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portion of the opinion in which the court articulates the claim 
made.  Id.  The court then, without holding whether or not the 
wage claims in and of themselves were valid under the WPCL, see 
id., rejected the plaintiff’s claim since the defendant played no 
active decision-making role in the non-payment of the wages and 
benefits at issue. See id. at 686. 
 Adam is inapplicable because that case did not involve 
the question of what happens to wages and benefits that are 
accrued pre-petition, but come due only in the post-petition 
period.  627 A.2d at 1189-90.  Instead, in Adam, the wages and 
benefits at issue appear to have come due prior to the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition.  Id. at 1189. 
    
 III. 
 The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
  I respectfully dissent in part in this case which 
is of enormous significance under bankruptcy law.  As the 
majority  points out, Shenango Corporation in December 1992 filed 
a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  A group of Shenango's former employees sought 
to recover specific sums of money for vacation and supplemental 
retirement benefits earned before the petition was filed but due 
in the post-petition period in an action under the Pennsylvania 
Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, 
§ 260.1, et seq. (West 1992).  The employees brought the action 
against Mark and Andrew Aloe, officers of Shenango, in a 
Pennsylvania state court, but the Aloes removed the case to the 
district court which then referred it to the bankruptcy court.  
The Aloes then filed a third-party complaint against Shenango 
predicated on an indemnification agreement.  The bankruptcy court 
granted the Aloes and Shenango summary judgment against the 
employees' claims, and the district court affirmed.  The 
employees then appealed to this court. 
  The majority makes a comprehensive analysis 
upholding the bankruptcy court's exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and I join this portion of its opinion.  The 
majority then defines the "substantive issue" as "whether the 
employees can sue the Aloes, as officers of Shenango, under the 
WPCL for Shenango's non-payment of certain pre-petition benefits 
that became due to the employees in the period after Shenango had 
filed for bankruptcy."  Typescript at 13.  The majority points 
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out that employers must pay "fringe benefits and wage 
supplements," "as required" by the WPCL, and that employees may 
institute actions to collect such items if they are "payable."  
Id. at 14.  The majority recognizes that the top management of a 
company can be liable under the WPCL but characterizes their 
liability as being "contingent on the corporation's failure to 
pay debts that it owes."  Id. at 14.  It then indicates that once 
the corporation files a petition under Chapter 11, "it is 
obligated to pay wages and benefits only to the extent required 
by the bankruptcy workout."  Id.  The majority then concludes 
that the bankruptcy and district courts reached the correct 
result because "when a corporation under Chapter 11 fails to make 
payments that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit, the 
contingency needed to trigger the liability of corporate managers 
under the Pennsylvania WPCL never occurs."  Id. at 15. 
  The majority contends that its result is 
consistent with the goals underlying the WPCL.  It reasons that 
Pennsylvania law holds agents and officers liable "to give [them] 
an incentive to pay wages and benefits while the corporation 
still has the resources to do so," typescript at 15, citing 
Mohney v. McClure, 568 A.2d 682, 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aff'd 
per curiam, 604 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 1992).  It then concludes that 
"[g]iven that the purpose of the WPCL is to deter managers from 
strategically diverting company resources away from the payment 
of wages and benefits, it makes sense for the WPCL to apply in 
only those contexts in which the managers have room to behave 
strategically."  Typescript at 16.  The majority supports this 
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conclusion by citing Mohney v. McClure and Central Pa. Teamsters 
Pension Fund v. Burten, 634 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1986), 
for the proposition that only decision makers in the corporation 
can be liable under the WPCL.  
  According to the majority, the logic of Mohney 
applies here because "[o]nce Shenango filed for bankruptcy . . . 
management no longer had the power to choose not to use [its] 
funds to pay wages [because] bankruptcy law compelled it to 
refrain from paying the employees' claims."  Typescript at 17.  
It thus concludes that "the WPCL did not come into play."  Id. at 
18. 
  I reject the foregoing analysis.  Under the WPCL, 
the definition of employer encompasses "every person, firm, 
partnership, association, corporation, receiver or other officer 
of a court of this Commonwealth and any agent or officer of any 
of the above-mentioned classes employing any person in this 
Commonwealth."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 260.2a.  For clarity, 
in applying this definition throughout this opinion I distinguish 
"statutory employer(s)" from "conventional employer(s)."  Under 
the facts of this case, the corporation, Shenango, was the 
employer in the conventional sense; that is, the employer who 
actually paid wages and benefits to the employees (when such 
payments were made).  Under the WPCL, however, both a corporation 
and its agents and officers are deemed "employers"; I call the 
agents and officers "statutory employers."   
  For purposes of these proceedings, there is no 
doubt but that the Aloes are agents or officers of Shenango and 
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are thus the employees' statutory employers.  In fact, the 
bankruptcy court said as much for it indicated that "[a]bsent 
bankruptcy, the Aloes, in their positions as officers of 
Shenango, would have been liable for claimed amounts pursuant to" 
the WPCL.  Indeed, the majority does not suggest otherwise.  
Thus, in analyzing this case we undoubtedly must start from the 
premise that had there been no bankruptcy and Shenango had not 
made the payments, the Aloes would be liable under state law; 
again the majority does not suggest otherwise. 
  The majority characterizes agents' and officers' 
liability as a  "contingent" liability which comes into play when 
the corporation does not make the payments it owes.  I do not 
believe that the majority uses the term "contingent" in a 
technical or legal sense for the WPCL requires that "[e]very 
employer . . . must remit the deductions or pay or provide the 
fringe benefits or wage supplements" as required by the WPCL.  Id 
§ 260.3(b).  Inasmuch as the Aloes are employers, their 
responsibility under the WPCL was as primary as that of Shenango. 
 Yet, as a practical matter, I have no quarrel with the 
characterization of their liability as "contingent"; undoubtedly 
in the ordinary situation, the corporation, or conventional 
employer, pays the benefits; the liability of its agents or 
officers as statutory employers is significant only when the 
conventional employer does not make those payments. 
  But whether we characterize the Aloes' liability 
as contingent or primary makes no difference.  There cannot be 
the slightest doubt but that the legislature contemplated that if 
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the corporate employer, i.e., the conventional employer, did not 
make the payments required under the WPCL, then the decision-
making agents and officers as statutory employers would be liable 
for them.  This liability cannot be avoided by the majority's 
conclusion that the agents and officers should not be liable 
because the corporation lawfully could not make the payments.  
Nothing in the WPCL even remotely can be read to excuse the 
agents and officers as statutory employers, in this case the 
Aloes, from liability merely because the conventional employer, 
in this case, Shenango, cannot make the payments.  Nor does the 
WPCL distinguish a corporation's inability to make payments by 
reason of operation of law from its inability to make payments 
because it does not have the money to do so.   
  In fact, whether an agent's or officer's liability 
is viewed as primary or contingent, when the corporation as the 
conventional employer does not make the payments required by the 
WPCL, the parties confront the exact circumstance in which the 
legislature contemplated that the employees could hold the agents 
or officers as statutory employers liable.  Nothing could be 
clearer for, as we explained in Carpenters Health and Welfare 
Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 
1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), "the [legislature's] 
only apparent purpose [for defining an agent or officer as an 
employer] was to subject these persons to liability in the event 
that a corporation or similar entity failed to make wage 
payments."  I cannot join an opinion which excuses the agents and 
officers from liability at the exact time when it is important 
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that they be liable because the legislature cannot possibly have 
intended such a result. 
  I also point out that a decision-making agent's or 
officer's liability for payments due under the WPCL is not 
dependent on a showing of his or her culpability or scienter.  As 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained in Laborers Combined 
Funds v. Mattei, 518 A.2d 1296, 1300-01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(emphasis in original), "[o]f those courts which have had 
occasion to rule on the personal liability of corporate officers 
in the face of a corporation's failure to make its required 
contributions to various union funds, as provided for in their 
collective bargaining agreement, all have, without exception, 
held the officer(s) of the corporation personally liable, and 
they did so without reference to any proof of culpability or 
scienter as a sine qua non to establishing a contravention of the 
Act in a civil suit."  So there you have it.  If, as seems to be 
the case, the Aloes were the decision makers, they are liable for 
the amounts due under the WPCL and the case should be remanded to 
the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. 
  I respectfully suggest that the majority's 
contrary points are unavailing.  It points out that the 
imposition of agent or officer liability seeks to deter the 
corporate agents and officers from diverting to another purpose 
"funds that are meant to go towards paying wages and benefits."  
Typescript at 16.  I certainly agree with that proposition, yet 
the fact that an agent or officer who diverts funds may be liable 
under the WPCL does not mean that an agent or officer cannot be 
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liable without diverting funds.  Laborers Combined Funds makes 
this point clear for in that case even though a bookkeeper 
embezzled the money that should have been used to satisfy the 
obligations under the WPCL, the officers were liable because 
their liability was not dependent on their "culpability or 
scienter."  We should consider, too, the case of a corporation 
which never generated income, i.e., a new business, but which 
incurred obligations under the WPCL.  In that case there would be 
no funds to divert, yet surely the decision-making agents or 
officers would be liable.   
  The bottom line on the diversion theory is this: 
there is nothing in the WPCL itself or in the case law to support 
a conclusion that an agent or officer can be liable only if he or 
she diverts funds that should have been applied to obligations 
due under the WPCL.  The WPCL is not a trust fund statute 
imposing liability only when the agent or officer has misapplied 
the res, and thus it should not be treated as a trust fund 
statute.  Yet by predicating liability on the diversion theory, 
the majority treats the WPCL as a trust fund statute.  In fact, 
the WPCL establishes employers' liability without regard for 
trust fund concepts and, as we must on this appeal treat the 
Aloes as employers, they are potentially liable and were not 
entitled to summary judgment. 
  The majority contends that inasmuch as the purpose 
of the WPCL is "to deter managers from strategically diverting 
company resources away from the payment of wages and benefits, it 
makes sense for the WPCL to apply in only those contexts in which 
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the managers have room to behave strategically."  Typescript at 
16-17.  Here Shenango's bankruptcy deprived them of that room.  
Yet the cases the majority cites on the point do not support its 
conclusion in this case for they merely establish that corporate 
agents who are not corporate decision makers are not liable under 
the WPCL because they are not statutory employers.  See Mohney, 
568 A.2d 682, and Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 634 F. 
Supp. 128.  The immunity of the officers in those cases stemmed 
from the circumstance that they were not decision makers in the 
corporation, not from their failure or inability to have 
exercised control over the "decision" not to make the required 
payments.  These cases are not relevant to the issue at hand 
which is whether an agent or officer who is a statutory employer, 
and who by reason of a bankruptcy loses his or her freedom to 
apply the corporate assets strategically, nevertheless remains 
liable under the WPCL.   
  At the outset of this dissent, I said that this 
case is of enormous significance to bankruptcy law.  I will now 
explain why.  The principles involved in this case are applicable 
in any case in which a person has guaranteed a debt of a bankrupt 
corporation.  (I use the term "guaranteed" broadly to include co-
obligors, endorsers, and guarantors in situations in which, as 
between the debtors, the obligation to pay is primarily on the 
bankrupt.)  The majority seeks to distinguish this case "from an 
ordinary third-party guaranty of a debt," typescript at 18 n.7, 
and indicates that it intends to predicate its opinion solely on 
an interpretation of the Pennsylvania law as set forth in the 
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WPCL.  Thus, it believes that this case should not have 
implications in other contexts. 
  I believe, however, that this case is not 
distinguishable from a case involving an ordinary guaranty.  The 
majority says that the liability of agents and officers under the 
WPCL "is not automatic," but rather accrues only when the 
officers exercise decision-making authority with respect to the 
challenged nonpayment.  Transcript at 18 n.7.  However, for 
statutory employers the liability arises by operation of law, and 
thus to that extent it is indeed automatic.  Liability under the 
WPCL is not dependent on the circumstances surrounding or the 
causes of the nonpayment, whether external to or intrinsic within 
the statutory employers.  Thus, just like an ordinary guaranty, 
the liability of agents and officers under the WPCL is 
"automatic."  Furthermore, in the case of an ordinary guaranty, 
just as here, the creditors call on the guarantor to pay because 
the corporation cannot.   
  The majority's attempt to limit this case to an 
application of the WPCL fails for the additional reason that 
there is not even a hint in that Act that the liability of a 
statutory employer is affected by the bankruptcy of the corporate 
or conventional employer.  If a court can create a bankruptcy 
exception to the statutory employers' liability here, persons who 
have made other types of guarantees will seek similar relief.  
Accordingly, this case opens a door which will be hard to close. 
 But even if somehow the impact of this case could be limited to 
situations under the WPCL, I nevertheless think that the majority 
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is reaching the wrong result in this case which in itself is of 
great importance. 
  I close with one final point.  The majority 
apparently believes that practical considerations require it to 
reach its result.  It points out that "[c]orporate bankruptcies 
are not unusual events" and that corporations in Chapter 11 
proceedings are stayed from paying prepetition debts.  It thus 
indicates that an application of the WPCL in a situation such as 
this may result in imposition of "staggering personal liability" 
on corporate officers, thereby creating an incentive for 
corporations to avoid locating in Pennsylvania.  Typescript at 
18-19 n.8.  The problem with this point is that we are judges, 
not legislators, and it is beyond our power to rewrite the WPCL 
so as to create a bankruptcy exception in favor of statutory 
employers merely because we believe that it would be good for 
business to do so.   
  The majority does not point to a bankruptcy 
exception in the WPCL to support its conclusion that the 
"staggering personal liability" should not be imposed for the 
very good reason that the WPCL does not include any such 
provision.  Rather, the WPCL imposes liability on statutory 
employers without exception under the WPCL.  Thus, even under the 
majority's view that its result is consistent with the policy of 
the WPCL, which I reject, the majority should not read a 
bankruptcy exception into that act.  Rather, it should heed the 
point we made so recently in In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501, 506 (3d 
Cir. 1997), that we "are not free to ignore the clear language of 
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a Pennsylvania statute merely because by rewriting the statute we 
arguably would act consistently with a legislative policy."   
    In fact, the majority's creation of a 
bankruptcy exception in the WPCL has frustrated the purpose of 
the Act because relegating the employees to a remedy against the 
corporate employer means that they can recover only as provided 
in a plan of reorganization or, as I explain below, not recover 
at all.  This relegation almost surely will mean that the 
employees will not receive the payments due under the WPCL.  
Thus, I cannot understand why the majority suggests that this 
case merely involves a situation where the corporation is 
"temporarily stayed, by operation of the Bankruptcy Code," 
typescript at 18-19 n.8, from paying the employees' claims.  In 
fact, the employees' claims against Shenango largely have been 
discharged.  Shenango itself makes this point clear for it 
explains in its brief that "the Former Employees hold allowed 
unsecured claims against Shenango's estate and pursuant to the 
Plan the claims were discharged except to the extent that they 
will receive pro rata payments under the confirmed Plan of 
reorganization in satisfaction of the Wage Claims."  Br. at 3.   
  I also point out that there is no principled way 
to distinguish between large corporations in which claims against 
the statutory employers could be "staggering" and small one-
person corporations.  Thus, according to the logic of the 
majority opinion, if a small corporation owned and operated by a 
single person receives a discharge under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, even if, as is likely, the owner is a statutory 
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employer under the WPCL and is not in bankruptcy personally, he 
or she will be discharged from liability under the WPCL.  After 
all, the Bankruptcy Code restrains a corporation being liquidated 
under Chapter 7 from using its funds as it sees fit just as its 
restrains a corporation reorganizing under Chapter 11 in its use 
of its funds.  In such a case under Chapter 7 the employees may 
receive nothing on their WPCL claims even though the statutory 
employer has substantial assets.  I cannot conceive that the 
legislature intended such a result. 
   For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur 
in part and dissent in part. 
